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Since the end of the Second World War, statutory corporations have
become accepted instruments of economic activity on both sides of the
Iron Curtain. A wave of nationalization acts brought major utilities
under public control in Britain, France, Italy, and to a very limited
extent, the United States.' In colonial Africa, the statutory corporation
also became the official instrument of the Imperial British Govern-
ment's well-publicized policy of colonial reconstruction.' Largely as a
result of the increased reliance on socialist planning and the populariza-
tion of import substitution3 as a viable strategy for economic
development, the statutory corporation still remains a widely-employed
institution in post-independence Africa.4 As with most institutions in
developing Africa with roots in the colonial past, the structure of the
*Lecturer in Law, University of Zambia; LL.B., University of Ghana; LL.M., Yale University.
Mr. Botchwey is presently a J.S.D. candidate at the University of Michigan.
'See generally THE PUBLIC CORPORATION: A COMPARATIVE SYMPOSIUM (W. Friedman ed.
1954).
'See W. HALLEY, AN AFRICAN SURVEY 1325 (rev. ed. 1957).
31mport-substitution, as a policy prescription, argues in favor of the creation of industries to
manufacture locally hitherto imported items, especially where there is a demonstrated sizable
market for the product. The resulting reduction in the volume of imports permits the use of a
greater proportion of export earnings in purchasing plant and heavy machinery required for indus-
trialization. The policy was popularized especially by Dr. Prebisch (formerly Secretary-General
of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development) who pointed out the tendency of
the terms of trade to develop adversely against primary production countries. See Growth and
Decline of Import Substitution in Brazil, 9 ECON. BULL. LATIN AM. I, No. 1 (1964); Macario,
Protectionism and Industrialization in Latin America, 9 ECON. BULL. LATIN AM. 61, No. 1 (1964);
Birmingham, Integration and Economic Development, 1965 ILL. L.F. 795. See also 26 PARL. DEB.
No. 9, cols. 198-99 (1962) (Ghana).
'Most of the English-speaking countries in Africa have created statutory corporations to stimu-
late economic growth. The following is a random sample of these statutes: Industrial Development
Ordinance, ch. 517 (1954) (Kenya); Industrial Loans (Lagos and Federation) Ordinance, ch. 88
(1956), as amended Act No. 59 (1961) (Nigeria); Development Corporation Law, ch. 31 (1956),
as amended Edict No. 15 (1966) (Northern Nigeria); Industrial Bank of Sudan Act, No. 32 (1961)
(Sudan); Development Corporation Act, ch. 468 (1962), as amended Act No. 69 (1964), as
amended Act No. 16 (1968) (Tanzania); Uganda Development Corporation Ordinance No. 27
(1955), Legal Notice No. 39 (1963) (Uganda).
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statutory corporation has been influenced to a greater extent by prevail-
ing practice in the developed world, especially Britain, than by the
concrete features of the African setting. Yet it is by no means certain
that the Anglo-American model of the statutory corporation' is a suita-
ble vehicle for public corporate activity in a developing economy.
This article attempts an analysis of the functioning of the statutory
corporation in a developing economy. It is particularly aimed at deter-
mining whether the relevant legislation in the area has achieved the
proper balance between the two most crucial indices of statutory corpo-
rate organization: operational autonomy and public accountability.'
Instead of dealing with the problem generally, however, the article will
concentrate on the experience of the developing economy of Ghana.
Obviously there is some danger in treating the problems of Ghana as
being representative of those of the entire African continent.7 However,
this danger is greatly minimized by the fact that in much of the conti-
nent both the motivations behind the establishment of statutory corpo-
rations and the general characteristics of economic underdevelopment
are identical to those in Ghana.' Moreover, Ghana is a particularly
suitable case study because it conducted the experiment in statutory
corporate activity on a much wider scale than any other English-
speaking African country.9
THE INITIAL PROBLEM OF DEFINITION
It is difficult to define the proper balance between operational auton-
omy and public accountability in a statutory corporation. To do so is
to assume the basic question of what the role of the statutory corpora-
tion in economic development should be. Furthermore, a universal defi-
nition of the proper balance would have to assume what the structure
of a proper economic development should be. 0 This article will not deal
'The model is really more English than American, although the same concepts of autonomy and
accountability pervade public corporate organization in both countries.
'See W. ROBSON, NATIONALIZED INDUSTRY AND PUBLIC OWNERSHIP 138 (1960).
'This is admittedly the reverse of the most common tool of analytical effort, i.e., abstraction
from the secondary attributes of a phenomenon and concentration on its basic scaffolding. How-
ever, since the dominant features of statutory corporate activity are the same throughout English-
speaking Africa, no advantage will be lost in employing this method of analysis.
'See J. OSER, PROMOTING ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, ch. 4 (1967).
'This is because of the Nkrumah government's strong commitment to socialist planning as
evidenced by allocations made under the Seven Year Plan for Reconstruction and Development
(1963-1970). See SEVEN YEAR PLAN, OFFICE OF THE PLANNING COMMISSION 1-3 (1964). But see
R. GENOND, NATIONALISM AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN GHANA 217 (1969), where any de-
scription of Nkrumah's policy in terms of a socialist experience is termed "misleading."
'
0For an interesting treatment of the subject, see Frankel, Some Conceptual Aspects of Interna-
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with the problems underlying these two assumptions. For this article's
purposes, the proper balance is defined as that balance which allows a
public corporation to most efficiently achieve, or strive to achieve, the
goals stated in its charter.
Furthermore, "public accountability" will be defined as the degree to
which a public corporation is subjected to a consistent range of legisla-
tive and other governmental controls for the purpose of ensuring its
continued alignment with the stated aims of national policy." "Opera-
tional autonomy" will be defined as that amount of independent judg-
ment which a corporation may be permitted to exercise to ensure that
it achieves the flexibility requisite for its commercial operation.
I. STATUTORY CORPORATIONS IN GHANA
A. The Pattern of Colonial Legislation
The first statutory corporations in the colonial period were created
as manufacturing subsidiaries of the Gold Coast Industrial Develop-
ment Company, Limited. 2 None of these subsidiaries was created by
special statute; all were incorporated under the Companies Ordinance
of 1906,1 a virtual carbon copy of the British Companies Act of 1862.11
Under the Companies Ordinance, the only government control over the
subsidiaries was the control as exercised by a shareholder in an ordinary
corporation.
While the private company device allowed the subsidiaries maximum
independence, it also removed them from public accountability and
control. Since they were not created by special statute, these subsidiaries
did not answer directly to the legislature or to the government. Govern-
mental control over their policies and operations existed only to the
extent that the government-appointed board of the holding com-
tional Economic Development of Underdeveloped Territories, in ESSAYS IN INTERNATIONAL Fi-
NANCE, No. 14 (1952).
"This definition goes beyond the traditional meaning of public accountability which tends to
emphasize financial responsibility. Accountability, as it is defined here, covers other areas of
activity, such as research, job training, and education for which the corporation is equally answera-
ble to the public. For a valuable treatment of accountability in the Nationalized Industries in
Britain, see W. ROBSON, supra note 6, at 190.
"Created by the Industrial Development Corporation Ordinance No. 38 (1947) (Gold Coast).
The Gold Coast was a British colony which, along with a portion of other lands under British
trusteeship, was formed into the self-governing dominion of Ghana on March 6, 1957 and became
the present state of Ghana on July I, 1960. 10 ENCYCL. BRIT. 379 (1967).
3LAws OF THE GOLD COAST, ch. 156, as amended ch. 193 (1954).
4FINAL REPORT OF THE COMMISSION OF INQUIRY INTO THE WORKING AND ADMINISTRATION
OF THE PRESENT COMPANY LAW OF GHANA 2 (1961) [hereinafter cited as GOWER REP.].
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pany-the Industrial Development Company (IDC)-could control
them. But due to the anachronistic provisions of the 1906 Act under
which the subsidiaries were incorporated, IDC control over their fi-
nances and policy was largely illusory. 5 Of course, as to those subsidiar-
ies in which the IDC did not have a controlling interest, governmental
control was even more tenuous. Finally, since the subsidiaries were not
subject to any policy direction either by the government directly or
through the IDC, they were independent even as to matters of broad
policy.
A case in point will illustrate these objections. The Cocoa Purchasing
Company (CPC) was incorporated in 1952 under the Companies Ordi-
nance 6 with an authorized share capital of two thousand Ghana pounds
(£G2,000). It was constitutionally a wholly-owned subsidiary of the
Cocoa Marketing Board (CMB), a statutory body created in the same
year and organized on virtually the same principles as the IDC. The
Cocoa Purchasing Company was authorized under its articles of asso-
ciation to undertake, among other things, the purchase, storage, ship-
ment, and export of cocoa. The issuance of loans was not one of its
authorized functions. However, on the instruction of the Minister, the
CMB (the parent company) made the CPC an agent for the issuance of
loans to needy cocoa farmers on conditions stipulated by the govern-
ment. 7 The subsequent history of the loans scheme tells its own story.
Since the government had no de jure authority over the CPC, the
conditions on which the loans scheme was to be administered had to be
communicated to the CMB. Prior to this transmission, however, the
CPC, on its own initiative and out of its own resources (all its shares
were held by the CMB), decided to issue loans over the protests of the
Minister. When the government established the requisite conditions,
including a £G150 limit on loans for the relief of farmers' indebted-
ness, 8 the board of the CPC held that £G150 was simply inadequate
and decided to raise the limit to £G1500. 9 The variation was imple-
"Since there were no shareholders in the subsidiaries, the Ordinance provisions relating to
shareholder control did not afford any practical supervision of the management of the subsidiaries.
Although the Ordinance provided for another method of supervision, viz, the appointment of ad
hoc inspectors by the Governor, the relevant sections were so "brief and unsatisfactory" that they
"were incapable of being effectively employed to prevent impropriety in management."
See LAWS OF THE GOLD COAST, ch. 193, § 68-75 (1951); GOWER REP., supra note 14, at 163.
"LAWS OF THE GOLD COAST, ch. 156, as amended ch. 193 (1951).
7 REPORT OF THE COMMISSION OF INQUIRY INTO THE AFFAIRS OF THE COCOA PURCHASING
COMPANY 18 (1956) [hereinafter cited as JIBOWU COMM'N REP.].
191d.
"Id. at para. 23.
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mented for an entire year before ministerial approval was finally com-
municated through the CMB to the CPC.0 A government report later
blamed these and other irregularities of the CPC on the legal isolation
from governmental and legislative control resulting from the mecha-
nism of its incorporation. Commenting on that mechanism, the report
lamented:
While such an arrangement has many practical advantages, as the law
now stands, it has also the great disadvantage that it prevents the
Minister from supervising in any effective way, the conduct of the
Cocoa Purchasing Company. It will be appreciated that it is impossi-
ble for any Minister to control "by directions of a general character"
to the Cocoa Marketing Board the detailed conduct of a limited com-
pany whose only link with the Government is that its shares are owned
by a public authority.21
Indeed, it is senseless to speak of a balance between corporate autonomy
and public accountability in the subsidiaries because there was none.
Through the symbolism of the private company device, the colonial
government effectively removed the subsidiaries from the nagging quer-
ies of the new African majority in the legislative assembly.22 By and
large it was the organization of the IDC itself that was to determine the
relationship between public manufacturing corporations and the govern-
ment in the post-independence period.
The IDC was set up in 1947 as a limited liability company.23 Unlike
its subsidiaries, however, it was specifically exempted from the applica-
tion of the Companies Ordinance.24 Government control over the IDC
consisted of appointments and authorizations and examination of re-
ports by the legislature.
The Governor-in-Council, the colonial chief executive, appointed five
of a maximum number of seven members of a board of directors. Two
"Letter from D. Abloth, acting Permanent Secretary of Ministry of Trade and Labour, to the
Managing Director, Cocoa Marketing Bd., dated Aug. 15, 1955, Jiaowu COMM'N REP., supra note
17, at 5 app. B.
"GOVERNMENT PROPOSALS IN REGARD TO THE FUTURE CONSTITUTION AND CONTROL OF STA-
TUTORY BOARDS AND CORPORATIONS IN THE GOLD COAST 6 (1956) (Ghana) [hereinafter cited as
GOVERNMENT PROPOSALS].
'rThe Constitution of 1946 gave the Colony and Ashanti representative government for the first
time. Elected members had a majority of six over the official and nominated members who were
all colonial administrators. Although in practice the power of the Imperial Parliament was pre-
served in the form of a broad power vested in the Governor-in-Council to veto legislation "in the
interest of public order," the African majority was still a powerful political weapon. See F.
BRENNION, THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF GHANA 37-39 (1962).
"Industrial Development Ordinance No. 38 (1947) (Gold Coast).
2
-1d. § 18.
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of these five were required to be nominees of the two Councils of
Chiefs. 5 While the government held more than half of the shares avail-
able to the public, the Governor could appoint the two other board
members from a group of persons nominated by the Legislative Coun-
cil. 26 Members of the board held office for at least three years, and the
Governor determined their remuneration.2 7
Dividend rates had to receive the Governor's written approval if they
were in excess of nine percent per annum.28 Copies of the Corporation's
profit and loss account and the report of the board chairman had to be
sent to the Governor, 29 who then was obligated to send them to the
legislative assembly "as soon as possible. '33
An examination of the constitutive ordinance in its totality suggests
that the colonial government was rather uncertain about the constitu-
tional status of the IDC. Indeed, to a government officially committed
to the export of primary products, a public corporation engaged in
industrial activity was an embarrassing anomaly. The choice of a lim-
ited liability company as an instrument of public corporate activity,
instead of the conventional public corporation, then in its formative
years ifl Britain, was an attempt to fit that anomaly into the general
laissez faire orientation of colonial policy. 3' It is against this back-
ground that the relationship between the IDC and the legislative and
executive bodies must be analyzed.
Although the Ordinance made provision for the issuance of shares to
the public, 32 it was contemplated from the beginning that the finances
of the IDC would consist wholly of government appropriations.3 3 This
was because domestic saving ratios were extremely low and further
complicated by constraints imposed by the extended family system 34 as
well as public distrust of interest-bearing securities.3 1 Since risk-
avoiding private financial institutions would not usually purchase securi-
-ld. § 6(3).261d. § 6(4).
"d. §§ 6(l)-(2).
Uld. § 15.
2Id. §§ 18(1)(a)-(b).
-1Id. § 18(2).
"See Section II, infra.
"Industrial Development Ordinance No. 38, § 11 (1947) (Gold Coast).
'ln an introduction of the Gold Coast Industrial Development Bill before the Legislative
Council, the government indicated that it intended to hold all shares until "good results are
shown." 2 LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL DEBATES 96 (1947) (Gold Coast).
"See Garlick, African-owned Private Enterprise Company Formation in Ghana, 4 ECON. BULL.
I, No. 2 (1960).
"1GOWER REP., supra note 14, at 2.
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ties in "unprofitable" infant industries in the absence of government
guarantees (which the Ordinance did not provide), the only significant
source of financing was the publicly-held Cocoa Marketing Board sur-
plus. 6 But, while there was no question from the very beginning that
the IDC was to operate as a government-financed public institution,
controls over its policy and operations were extremely lax.
This laxity originated with the statement of the objects of the corpora-
tion, which were:
(a) with the approval of the Governor-in-Council to establish and con-
duct any industrial undertaking; and
(b) to facilitate, promote, guide and assist in the financing of,
(i) new industries and industrial undertakings; and
(ii) laboratories for the investigations of the commercial pos-
sibilities of products and the plants, equipment and technique
necessary for making the same;
(iii) schemes for the expansion, better organization and mod-
ernization of, and the more efficient carrying out of operations
in existing industries and industrial undertakings 7. 3
While the net effect of this statement was to make the IDC a central
planning authority, there was not even the vaguest hint of the sort of
industries it was to establish or of the policy objectives it was to seek.
A clear-cut policy guideline should have been included in the enabling
ordinance, but not merely because the IDC was engaged in industrial
planning. Two other considerations make such a guideline an absolute
necessity. The first of these, which has already been mentioned, is the
fact that the subsidiaries were removed from governmental and legisla-
tive control by the method of their incorporation and the general body
of laws to which they were subject. The second is that there was no
extra-statutory government pronouncement such as the later-day Devel-
opment Plan which the IDC's board could consult for authoritative
direction. The only possible guide, the Metropolitan Colonial Develop-
ment Act of 1929,31 did not speak to the industrialization of the colo-
nies as such but was designed to enable advances to be made by the
British Government to the colonies "for the purpose of aiding and devel-
oping agriculture and industry in the colony or territory and thereby
promoting commerce with, or industry in the United Kingdom"! 31
6For an account of the vast foreign exchange earnings accumulated by the Cocoa Marketing
Board in the colonial period, see W. BIRMINGHAM, I. NEWTADT & E. OMABOE, A STUDY OF
CONTEMPORARY GHANA 339-42 (1966) [hereinafter cited as BIRMINGHAM].
37Industrial Development Ordinance No. 38, § 4 (1947) (Gold Coast).
'Metropolitan Colonial Development Act of 1929, 19 & 20 Geo., c.5.
"'BIRMINGHAM, supra note 36, at 441 n.1.
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A second element in the laxity of governmental control of the IDC
was the absence of a statutory power in the minister or other executive
official to give directions of any nature to the IDC concerning any
aspect of its business. Even the power of "general direction," which by
1947 was a standard form of public control of nationalized industries
in Britain,4" was not made a feature of the IDC's relationship with the
government.
It is difficult to determine whether the apparent lack of a clear-cut
policy guideline and the laxity of government control were meant to
insulate the IDC from the new African majority in the legislative assem-
bly4 while leaving it a free hand to pursue policies that would pose no
threat to the interests of British oligopolies. There is some evidence that
the IDC was positively discouraged from taking its vague mandate too
seriously.42 Whatever the motive, the important point is that in the first
phase of the colonial experiment public control was rather minimal. The
IDC subsidiaries determined their own economic objectives, pricing pol-
icies and auditing systems. Government control was limited to appoint-
ments to the board of the IDC and the examination of the subsidiaries'
annual reports, whose form and content the subsidiaries themselves
determined.
One result of the lack of policy direction in the IDC was that for the
first several years of its operation, it operated essentially as a loans
agency, financing private projects which were "only of secondary im-
portance to the overall economy of the country."4 Most of these loans
were ultimately written off as bad debts largely because the IDC's ordi-
nance did not provide any machinery for the effective supervision of the
loans or their recovery.4
Changes in 1951 brought the IDC under closer governmental and
legislative scrutiny. Prevailing mechanisms of control, as utilized in the
organization of British nationalized industries, were introduced. Corpo-
rate funds consisted essentially of government appropriations or "ad-
vances" from the Ministry of Industries, but loans could be obtained
from private or public commercial banks.4" In either case there was a
government guarantee to repay both principal and interest. 6 Apart from
"
0See W. ROBSON, supra note 6, at 139-40.
"See note 14, supra.
2R. FITCH & M. OPPENHEIMER, GHANA: THE END OF AN ILLUSION 80 (1968).
"
3 BIRMINGHAM, supra note 36, at 289.
11W. LEwis, REPORT ON INDUSTRIALIZATION AND THE GOLD COAST 13 (19*3).
"Industrial Development Ordinance No. 22 (1951) (Gold Coast).
"Id. §§ 8(2)-(3).
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authorizing loans and advances to the corporation, the Minister ap-
pointed members of the board and the corporation's auditor.,7
The most important element in the 1951 changes, however, was the
power of the Minister to give "the Corporation such directions as he
shall think fit as to the duties to be performed by the Managing Direc-
tor." '48 (emphasis added). The Governor-in-Council was also authorized
to "give to the Corporation directions of a general character as to the
exercise and performance of their powers in relation to matters appear-
ing to the Governor-in-Council to concern the public interest."4 (em-
phasis added). Despite the obvious difference in the language of the two
provisions their practical effect was the same: both the Minister and the
Governor had authority to issue "general directions" to the board on
broad issues of corporate policy."
By the time of its dissolution5 the IDC was structurally a replica of
the Anglo-American statutory corporation. It had a Managing Director
nominally responsible to a Board of Directors, which in turn was re-
sponsible to the Minister. In principle the Minister was responsible to
the legislature. The range of public controls started with appointments
and ended with legislative reviews of annual reports.
B. False A nalogies in the Pattern of Colonial Legislation
The premise underlying colonial corporation legislation was that the
successful statutory corporation must maintain the dichotomy between
"day to day" business affairs, in which the corporation must be autono-
mous, and matters of "general policy," in which the government may
legitimately interfere. The board of directors was expected to keep the
dichotomy operative at all times. However, the need to separate "day
to day" and "general policy" decisions is not as distinct in the Ghanaian
setting.
The line of demarcation between "policy" and "day to day" business
is difficult to draw. Both categories possess a confusing penumbra.
Policy formation occurs at a number of levels, and it is frequently
difficult to maintain the distinction. A host of small decisions of "day
to day" business could collectively involve an issue of national import-
ance. 2 If corporation A discharged two workers from one of its facto-
41Id. §§ 8-15.
"Id. § 14.
"Id. § 13.
"See JIBOWU COMM'N REP., supra note 17, at 8.
"The IDC was disbanded in 1962 and its projects transferred to a newly created Ministry of
Industries.
'
2M. DIMOCK, BRITISH PUBLIC UTILITIES AND NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT 160-61 (1933).
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ries, the action and its rationale may appear "day to day" on the sur-
face, but it may involve broader issues of employment policy and the
corporation's sensitivity to nationally determined employment guide-
lines. In Britain itself the distinction has always been attended by confu-
sion, which usually arises during parliamentary debates.53 The amount
and cost of transportation in London provided for members of the
National Coal Board (NCB), the employment and remuneration of
private firms for underground surveying by the NCB, the ages of mem-
bers of Divisional Coal Boards, the number of non-industrial staff em-
ployed by the Board, and allegations that a Coal Board poster contained
"provocative and crude political propaganda" have all been classified
as "day to day" business.54 Yet some of these could conceivably involve
issues of general policy on which the Minister may issue general direc-
tions. If the National Coal Board was, for instance, employing non-
industrial staff in excess of its stated requirements, that could hardly be
said to be none of the public's business. Similarly, if it used one of its
departments to distribute political propaganda, issues of general policy
could be raised. 55
To eliminate the artificiality and arbitrariness inherent in the
dichotomy, the tendency in the British experience in recent times has
moved towards more informal mechanisms of ministerial control. In the
words of Professor Robson:
It has . . . become abundantly clear in recent years that the power to
issue directions and other legal means of control possessed by the
Minister are of far less importance in the relations between the govern-
ment and nationalized industries than the influence exercised infor-
mally through discussion, negotiation and pressure. 56
This system of informal checks has worked reasonably well in Britain.
Notwithstanding this fact, occasional charges are heard that statutory
restrictions on the scope of ministerial direction unduly isolate the na-
tionalized industries from public surveillance.57 In the Ghanaian experi-
ence the tendency was for the Board to deny the Minister vital informa-
tion and reports that it was required by statute to furnish him on the
ground that such information pertained to "day to day" management. 8
"See W. ROBSON, supra note 6, at 165-77.
"
1 Hanson, Parliamentary Questions on the Nationalized Industries, 29 PUBLIC ADMIN. REV. 53-
54 (1951).
"Id. at 54.
sW. ROBSON, supra note 6, at 142.
"Hanson, supra note 54, at 61.
"See, e.g., F. GOLSA, BUDGET STATEMENT 8 (1963-64) (Ghana), where the Minister makes an
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But even assuming that it is possible to draw the line of demarcation
between that which is "day to day" and that which is "policy," the
dogged theory that there is a direct causal relationship between stringent
government controls and inefficiency in the working of the statutory
corporation is open to some objection. Logically it is untenable, for it
surely cannot be said that government directions on "day to day" mat-
ters lead inevitably to "inefficiency" irrespective of the quality of the
directions and manner in which they reach the board. If the operative
considerations are the quality of the directions and the manner of their
administration, then the theory that government direction over details
of management leads to less commercial viability is too dogmatic. But
if the theory is not based on abstract logic, neither is it based on any
cause and effect proof. Indeed, such proof may be impossible. How does
one prove, for instance, that a drop in the efficiency of workers in
factory B is due to the Minister of Industries' sending the management
specific instructions that workers should be at work punctually? Al-
though a recent study has established some correlation between total
amount of control and its distribution and organizational effectiveness,59
it is important to note that the subject of the study was a purely adminis-
trative organization. It is therefore questionable whether the finding
lends empirical evidence to the theory that such a cause and effect
relationship in a business enterprise exists. Significantly, the same study
reported that the correlation is much weaker in businesses that stress
competition and individual initiative. 0
What may be called the Morrisonian' dichotomy is grounded upon
a desire to avoid the crippling bureaucracy that supposedly character-
izes a government department:
The underlying reason for the creation of a modern type of public
corporation is the need for a high degree of freedom, boldness and
enterprise in the management of undertakings of an industrial or com-
mercial character and the desire to escape from the caution and cir-
cumspection which is considered typical of a government."
This is essentially an a priori argument: since government control and
impassioned plea for information from the corporations.
59See Marcus & Cagagna, Control in Modern Organization, 25 PUBLIC ADMIN. REV. 123 (1965).
For an example of such an administrative organization (The League of Women Voters) see Tan-
nenbaum, Control and Effectiveness in a Voluntary Organization, 68 AM. J. SOCIOLOGY 33-46
(1961).
"Tannenbaum, supra note 59, at 121.
"After Mr. (later Lord) Herbert Morrison, who in 1947 was President of the Council, Leader
of the House, and principal architect of the modern public corporation.
eW. ROBSON, supra note 6, at 47.
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direction of government departments tends to produce red tape and
inefficiency, it is highly probable that such controls will produce similar
results in a statutory corporation. To avoid that probability the corpora-
tion's "day to day" activities must be exempted from political interfer-
ence. Politicians, according to this argument, are "inquisitive and irre-
sponsible guardians of the public interests," who represent divergent
and often competing interests of different localities. Ministerial control
over "day to day" activities would inevitably be influenced by these
competing pressures. Furthermore, since political officials hold office
for relatively short terms, corporate progress could be unduly frag-
mented if corporate management were to change coloration every time
a new minister, authorized to meddle in the administration of a corpora-
tion, came into office. It is easy to see from the above that the Morri-
sonian dichotomy, a product of the political climate which followed
World War II, is essentially a compromise between two competing
ideologies in Britain: the socialist ideology of the Labour Party, with
its commitment to a planned economy, and the laissez-faire ideology of
the Conservative Party, with its distrust of government in business.13
While the arguments supporting the dichotomy have their merits, 4
they do not have universal validity. Since the assumption that stringent
government control leads to inefficiency is not based on logic, it must
derive its validity from the dynamics of a given forum. The dynamics
of underdeveloped nations usually militate against such an assumption.
In Ghana, the assumption was unequivocably rejected by an informed
report in 1956.11 After noting Morrison's arguments in favor of corpo-
rate autonomy in "day to day" activity, the 1956 government report
added:
The Government has given careful thought to these arguments, but in
the special circumstances of the Gold Coast they believe that the ad-
vantages of greater control of statutory authorities considerably out-
weigh the disadvantages.
Some of those "special circumstances" were, and continue to be, the
invariable confinement of expertise in other departments and ministries,
the less significant effect of such extra-legal checks on corporate activity
as trade unions, consumer councils, and the press, 7 and the inevitable
"'For an interesting analysis of the prenationalization political debates, see Chester,
Management and Accountability in Nationalized Industries, 30 PUBLIC ADMIN. REV. 27 (1952).
4See Morrison, Public Control of the Specialized Industries, 28 PUBLIc ADMIN. REv. 3 (1950).
'SJIBOWU COMM'N REP., supra note 17, at n. 45.
"Ild. at 9.
"in the experience of nationalized industries, consumers, consultative councils and trade unions
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nepotism and corruption at all levels of corporate activity which accom-
pany lax governmental control."8
The application of the Morrisonian dichotomy to the organization of
the IDC is questionable on another ground. Unlike the nationalized
industries in Britain, the IDC never engaged in manufacturing or pro-
duction. Industrial and commercial operations of the IDC were as-
sumed by subsidiaries, partly or wholly financed by it, incorporated
under general corporate laws. 9 As a type of holding company it was
essentially engaged in policy formation, i.e., the creation of new indus-
tries within the context of a national economic strategy and the determi-
nation of their economic objectives. Thus, quite apart from the question-
able validity of the dichotomy as discussed above, its application to the
IDC was still disingenuous. The difficulty in determining when "day to
day" policy became general policy was even greater with an institution
such as the IDC which dealt essentially with various levels of policy
decision. The result was the isolation of matters of national policy from
ministerial or legislative scrutiny. A perfect example is the case of the
IDC (Cinemas) LTD.70
In 1957 the IDC decided to enter the movie industry, although re-
quired by statute to emphasize manufacturing and production. Pursuant
to this decision the corporation purchased a private concern, the West
African Pictures Company, incorporated it as a subsidiary and ap-
pointed its proprietor the Managing Director of the new company. The
Director continued to operate a private theater in competition with the
IDC subsidiary and also appointed his illiterate brother as one of the
managers of the new company. Rates at the company's public theaters
were habitually in excess of advertised rates, and proceeds from ticket
sales were constantly embezzled by the manager. Sometimes customers
were not even issued tickets, and accounting procedures were completely
chaotic. When a member of Parliament raised these anomalies during
debate, the Minister directed the Board of the IDC to investigate the
alleged irregularities in its subsidiary. However, the Minister refused to
make the results of the investigation available to the public or answer
any questions in the House related to the details of the findings, on the
provide very strong checks on the policy decisions of the public corporations. See W. RoBsoN,
supra note 6, at 243-75.
'A remarkable illustration of this tendency is the case of the Cocoa Purchasing Company. See
JIBOWU COMM'N REP., supra note 17.
"See note 12 supra and accompanying text.
"This example and all its details are taken from a private member's motion introduced in the
House on July 10, 1957. See 6 PARL. DEB. 1903-19 (1957) (Ghana).
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ground that he had no legal power of direction over the subsidiary.
Thus, broad matters of national importance regarding the operations of
the subsidiary-conflicts of interest, nepotism in hiring, consumer pro-
tection-were legally removed from the purview of his control. What is
more incredible is that the initial decision of the parent company to
invest in the movie industry, although an important investment issue,
was apparently treated as a "day to day" activity and thereby removed
from ministerial direction.
C. Post IDC Reforms: Control Through Direct Legislation
The confusion that surrounded the proper structure of the IDC, the
absence of effective powers of government direction and the remoteness
of public control over the subsidiaries all arose in part from the inherent
ambiguities in economic policy between 1947 and 1961. 71 While the
rhetoric of government officials suggested a firm commitment to indus-
trialization, national expenditure was still dominated by the develop-
ment of other sectors of the economy.72 Since, according to the govern-
ment's economic advisor, Arthur Lewis, the lifeblood of industriali-
zation was foreign investment,73 direct government activity was to be
kept at a minimum.74 Consequently, it was not a matter of absolute
importance that the proper legal machinery be devised for the execution
of government industrial activity. However, the Lewis strategy failed.
The entrepreneurial class by its own cost-benefit calculation opted to
abide by the colonial policy of extraction and retail trade.75 Meanwhile,
7 See BIRMINGHAM, supra note 36, at 30.7 2The First Consolidation Development Plans (1950-1959) made financial allocations as follows:
£G million
Agriculture and Natural Resources ................................. 7,616
Industry and T rade ............................................... 5,548
E lectricity ....................................................... 4,440
C om m unications ................................................. 35,955
Local and Regional Government ................................... 6,000
Education ....................................................... 17,390
Inform ation and Broadcasting ..................................... 1,176
H ousing ........................................................ 7,862
Health, Sanitation, W ater Supplies ................................. 15,033
Police and Prisons ............................................... 2,953
M iscellaneous ................................................... 13,549
Source: Second Development Plan, ch. I (1959-1964). Economic and productive services thus
constituted only 16.9% of the two plans.
71R. FITCH & M. OPPENHEIMER, supra note 42, at 82-83.
741d. at 83.
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the vast reserves that the Cocoa Marketing Board had accumulated over
the years and "invested" in Britain had been drained and a balance of
payment deficit had taken their place.7" By 1960, the Lewis strategy was
no longer within the range of possible choice. The legal instruments of
direct government activity came to require greater definition, and statu-
tory corporations were therefore established by special legislation.
1. The Statutory Corporation Acts
The first Statutory Corporations Act enacted in 1959 provided for the
establishment of public corporations by the Governor-General with a
residual power of approval in the legislative assembly.77 The second Act
virtually re-enacted the first but abrogated the residual power of ap-
proval in the legislature,7" and the current Act provides for the creation
of statutory bodies by "legislative instrument" instead of "executive
instruments."7 This last Act will form the basis of the discussion which
follows.
The significance of the Statutory Corporations Act is that it allocates
to the government the power to decide what industries shall be created
and how they should be controlled-a function that hitherto had been
exercised by the IDC itself. It has been noted that the delegation of this
function to the IDC should have been made subject to specific direction
by the government and periodic examination by the legislature, espe-
cially since the subsidiaries, once created, were totally removed from
such controls.8 0 By giving the initial decision to the government, the
7 d. at 91.
"Statutory Corporations Act, No. 53, §§ 5-6 (1959) (Gold Coast).
7 Statutory Corporations Act, No. 41 (1960) (Ghana).
7 Statutory Corporations Act, No. 232 (1964) (Ghana). The main distinction between legislative
instruments and executive instruments appears to be the manner of their publication. Under Article
40 of the Republican Constitution of Ghana, the laws of Ghana included "enactments made ...
under authority of the Parliament established by the Constitution." Any enactment made pursuant
to authority conferred by the Constitution or by Parliament became a "statutory instrument." The
Attorney-General was authorized to declare certain statutory instruments "legislative" and others
'executive." Under a declaration made by the Attorney-General pursuant to that authority, the
Statutory Instruments Order, 1960, all instruments made under specified enactments or under
powers expressed to be exercisable by legislative instrument were known as "legislative instru-
ments." All other statutory instruments were "executive instruments." All legislative instruments
must be published in the Gazette, but executive instruments need not be. A second possible
distinction between the two instruments is that legislative instruments are, as their name suggests,
juridical in content and practical in effect, while executive instruments are usually in the nature of
administrative directions. This distinction is, however, misleading since some executive instruments
operate as "laws," the violation of which automatically results in some form of sanction.
1'The observation may be compared with congressional criticism of the power of the Wartime
Reconstruction Finance Company to set up subsidiaries without congressional approval. See 91
CONG. REC. 8547, 8560-62 (1945).
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Statutory Corporations Act gave the President a unique opportunity to
redefine the entire process of accountability and corporate autonomy
without the need for direct legislative action. Significantly, this situation
coincided with an increase in socialist rhetoric in official pronounce-
ments.8
The vesting of complete discretion in the President to determine in-
dustrial strategy is, of course, open to criticism. It may be argued that
such power may be exploited easily for political advantage and that
initial policy decisions should be subject to legislative approval premised
upon the goals of the national policy. In rebuttal, it may be asserted that
since both the Statutory Corporations Act itself and the legislative in-
struments creating the public corporations are subject to repeal or
amendment, the legislature in fact has some leverage over governmental
decision, albeit ex post facto. The experience of the IDC and the noto-
rious scandals of the Cocoa Purchasing Company"2 would seem to sug-
gest that the Statutory Corporations Act should at least contain broad
guidelines for the exercise of the President's power. Admittedly, a
"checklist" of economic values will not guarantee that the most advan-
tageous decisions will be made, but it will at least provide some objective
basis for legislative control.
The corporations created under the Statutory Corporations Act were
more tightly controlled by the Government, although, as we shall dem-
onstrate, the colonial concepts of accountability and autonomy contin-
ued to underline the organization of the subsidiaries.
2. The State Enterprises Secretariat: A Case of Stillbirth
The State Enterprises Secretariat, the new holding company which
replaced the Industrial Development Company, was born out of the
frustrations of the colonial stragegy. As such, its statute exhibits an
obvious expansion of the range of government control.8 3
Charged with the promotion of statutory corporations engaged in
trade or industry, the State Enterprises Secretariat (SES) was given
extensive powers over the operations of the subsidiaries. It was charged,
among other things, to set annual goals and production targets for all
the statutory corporations within its ambit of control, initiate training
schemes and coordinate programs for the training of employees of indi-
vidual corporations, purchase supplies and carry out periodic inspec-
8'Witness the publication of the "Program of the Convention People's Party for Work and
Happiness," in April, 1962. See D. APTER, GHANA IN TRANSITION 393-421 (1963).
2See JIBOWU COMM'N REP., supra note 17.
"
1See Legislative Instrument, No. 457 (Ghana).
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tions to ensure that government policy was obeyed to the letter. 4 Its
head, the Executive Secretary, was appointed by the President and
charged with conveying government policy to the various subsidiaries.
Every phase of SES operations was subject to "general or specific"
direction by the President. The colonial dichotomy between "day to
day" matters and "general policy" was therefore abolished.
Despite these numerous controls, the SES remained just another gov-
ernment agency vis-Z-vis the statutory corporations. It never held any
shares in any corporation and never set any goals or placed any orders
for supplies.8 1 It conducted inspections, but these were essentially rou-
tine visits to various plants; reports from the numerous subsidiaries were
usually vague. 8 In practice the SES became a "post office,"8 carrying
messages to and from the various statutory corporations, which them-
selves remained largely independent. The U.N. Report on the SES gives
two reasons for the inability of SES to exercise its statutory powers of
supervision over the subsidiaries:8 (1) lack of trained personnel and (2)
inadequate legal controls. The first of these, of course, is true. The
shortage of trained personnel is a common feature of underdevelop-
ment. However, the argument that the SES lacked adequate legal con-
trols over the subsidiaries is completely false.88 Even a cursory glance
at the statute shows the exact opposite. What the Report fails to note
is that the SES and its subsidiaries were operating on two distinct jural
norms based upon two contradictory principles. On the one hand was
the statute of the SES which gave it authority to effectively direct all
aspects of the subsidiary's activity, 0 and on the other was the set of
instruments creating the subsidiaries which, while acknowledging re-
sponsibility to a number of government departments including SES,
expressly issued an injunction to all such departments against interfer-
ence in matters of management. The practical isolation of the subsidiar-
ies from the statutory controls of the SES, therefore, resulted equally
from the lack of trained personnel and the basic incompatibility of the
two pieces of legislation. An examination of the entire process of ac-
countability in the subsidiary lends concrete proof to this argument.
111d. at pt. 11, § 2(7).
"REPORT OF THE UNITED NATIONS MISSION ON THE RE-ORGANIZATION OF THE STATE ENTER-
PRIZES SECRETARIAT IN GHANA 5 [hereinafter cited as U.N. REP.].
"Id. at 10.
'lid. at 5.
1Id. at II.
"See Legislative Instrument, No. 475 (Ghana).
1*U.N. REP., supra note 85, at 26-28.
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D. The Process of Accountability within the Statutory Corporation'
1. Appointments and Dismissals
In all the subsidiaries, appointments to the board of directors are
made directly by the Minister. All members of the board and their
chairman are appointed by the Minister with the approval of the Cabi-
net for a minimum term of one year. 2 Any member of the board may
be removed by the Minister acting with the approval of the Cabinet.93
In order to ensure some continuity in policy, members ceasing to hold
office are eligible for reappointment. 4 Thus, the statutes vest the power
of appointment and dismissal of board members exclusively in the Min-
ister and the Cabinet. There is no policy statement in the statutes con-
cerning qualifications or conditions for disqualification. The Minister
has plenary discretion in the matter.
There are a number of competing considerations in the area of board
appointments that can be abstracted from the general pattern of legisla-
tion in the Anglo-American experience. In a democracy it is considered
axiomatic that vital appointments to public institutions should be made
by the executive. Ministerial appointment of board members ensures
their responsibility to the public and in turn provides the logical justifi-
cation for the Minister's accountability to the legislature for the good
conduct of such appointees."5 The practice of Appointing Trustees, in-
troduced in the London Passenger Transport Act of 1933, 91 was an
anomaly and was tersely condemned as simply fantastic.97 On the other
hand, if a spoils system is to be prevented, it is important that such
appointments be based on competence. To that end, the Nationalization
Acts generally require the Minister to appoint persons with demon-
strated competence in specified fields of activity. 8 Such provisions are
'Legislative Instrument, No. 412 (Ghana), which incorporated the State Meat Products Corpo-
ration, is used here as an example. The sections of Legislative Instrument, No. 412, usually
correspond both in chronology and content to the relevant sections of all the other legislative
instruments. Exceptions will be noted.
'
2Legislative Instrument, No. 412, §§ 2-4 (Ghana).
'"id. § 4.
'4d. § 5.
" In the words of Herbert Morrison, "Somebody ought to be accountable for the appointments.
There should be somebody definite to shoot at." See ACCOUNTABILITY IN GOVERNMENT DEPART-
MENTS, PUBLIC CORPORATIONS AND PUBLIC COMPANIES 51 (R. Ennis ed. 1967).
'923 & 24 Geo. 5, c. 14.
'
7 The Public Service Board General Conclusions, PUBLIC ENTERPRIZE 367 (W. Robson ed.
1937).
11W. ROBSON, supra note 6, at 213-23.
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not unlike that of the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) Act which
prescribes a "Merit System" for appointments."
Such statutory admonitions, to be sure, can only aim at making
competence the prerequisite of such appointments. They do not, and
cannot, guarantee that political considerations will not enter into the
Minister's judgment. Indeed, if a tradition of rectitude in ministerial
conduct existed, appointments would be based on competence even in
the absence of a statutory command. Thus, it is misleading to blame the
highly partisan nature of board appointments and the general incompet-
ence of such appointees entirely on the absence of statutory prohibitions
equivalent to those of the Anglo-American model. °0  The problem goes
to the very heart of post-independence political organization. Its solu-
tion will have to be more fundamental than the mere prescription of
statutory guidelines for high level appointments, although there is some
evidence that such guidelines could at least minimize the political abuse
of the power of appointment.' 0'
The more significant point, however, is that despite the State Enter-
prises Secretariat's general supervision of the conduct of the subsidiar-
ies, it had absolutely no control over board or managerial appointments.
It did not even serve in a consultative capacity. This fact greatly under-
mined its authority over the board, for it generated the feeling among
members of the board that they could flout the dictates of the SES with
impunity, since, in their estimation, they were only responsible to the
Minister. These members usually insisted on direct communication with
the Minister even when the instruments of their incorporation provided
to the contrary. 02 On the face of it, there is nothing wrong with a good
rapport between board and Minister. For example, the relationship
between board and Minister in nationalized industry in Britain is largely
governed by extra-statutory conventions. 03 In Ghana, however, the
SES was legally responsible for "ensuring that these corporations are
run efficiently and profitably and in accordance with the terms of the
instruments of their incorporation." 4 Thus, a dilution of SES authority
1116 U.S.C. § 831(a) (1964). See also TVA, THE FIRST TWENTY YEARS 52-55 (R. Martin ed.
1956).
'1"U.N. REP., supra note 85, at 4.
"0'The management of joint state-private enterprises were generally chosen on the basis of merit.
See U.N. REP., supra note 85, at 8. They managed to maintain a high rate of efficiency. See
BUDGET STATEMENT 60 (1966) (Ghana).
'°0U.N. REP., supra note 85, at 4.
'0W. ROBSON, supra note 6, at 142-46. For the opposite view that such a relationship makes
the board overly dependent on the Minister, see Chester, The Nationalized Industry, THREE BANKS
REVIEW 41-42 (Dec. 1952).
'uPresident's Sessional Address to Parliament, Jan. 12, 1965, 38 PARL. DEB. I I (1965) (Ghana).
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meant a relaxation of government control over the operation and the
discipline of the board. This lack of discipline also affected the conduct
of low-level personnel who were appointed by the board . 0 5
In contrast to the method of board appointments, the Managing
Director, who is in charge of the "day to day" administration, is ap-
pointed by the Minister with the approval of the Cabinet and upon the
recommendation of the SES.106 Again, unlike the board, the terms and
conditions of his service are contractual, and there is no provision for
summary dismissal at the instance of the Minister. Despite authority
both in Britain and in the United States to the effect that executive
appointees may be removed before the expiration of their contractual
terms,107 it seems reasonable to say that the Managing Director enjoyed
greater security than the members of the board. However, his responsi-
bility to a highly political and generally sycophantic board made such
security largely illusory. 05 Thus, the government's power of appoint-
ment over the boards and Managing Directors of statutory corporations
provided little leverage on the policy and conduct of high-level person-
nel. At best, the power generally guaranteed a sense of personal fealty
in the appointees toward the Minister.0 9 Thus, the board and manage-
ment sense of public responsibility was seriously perverted.
2. Control Over Financial Policy
In general, the most important point of contact between the govern-
ment and the statutory corporation is the latter's finances. This financial
contact is evidenced in the corporation's authorized capital, deprecia-
"
51U.N. REP., supra note 85, at 8.
'
6Legislative Instrument, No. 412, pt. 6, § 3 (Ghana).
'The general position in the Nationalization Acts is that the Minister may remove a member
of the board who in his opinion becomes "unfit to continue in office or incapable of performing
his duties." The precise meaning of this phraseology is unclear. The general rule seems to be that
board members can be summarily dismissed without compensation, but that a dismissed member
may be paid compensation where the "merits of the situation so require." See 470 PARL. DEB.,
H.C. (5th ser.) 36 (1949) (two board members removed without compensation because a project's
cost exceeded their estimates); 475 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 206-08 (1950) and 476 PARL. DEB.,
H.C. (5th ser.) 218 (1950) (board chairman "retired" with compensation in face of project cost
overrun). See also Morgan v. TVA, 28 F. Supp. 732 (E.D. Tenn. 1939), aff d, 115 F.2d 990 (6th
Cir. 1939), cert. denied, 312 U.S. 701 (1940), which suggests that Executive appointees to the
boards of public corporations can be removed before expiration of their terms.
'"RREPORT AND FINANCIAL STATEMENTS BY THE ACCOUNTANT-GENERAL AND REPORT THEREON
BY THE AUDITOR-GENERAL FOR THE YEAR ENDED DEC. 31, 1964, para. 183 (1967) (Ghana)
[hereinafter cited as ACCOUNTANT-GENERAL'S REP.].
"'The State Farms Corporation, for instance, "under the semblance of official transaction,"
provided material and labor worth over £G730 for works at a private house occupied by a Minister.
Id. para. 202.
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tion reserve accounts, amounts of capital expenditure and pricing pol-
icy.
The legislative instruments provide for government appropriations to
cover the corporations' authorized capital."' There is some confusion
in the various instruments concerning the manner in which the appropri-
ations are to be made and by whom they are to be authorized. The board
of the corporation makes the request through the SES for a specified
amount and the "government" pays the amount upon the approval of
the Ministry of Finance."' In subsequent practice, the appropriations
came out of the Finance Ministry, but initially there was great adminis-
trative confusion as to the source of the grants, and most of the corpora-
tions began operations on bank overdrafts."' The ambiguity in the func-
tions of the various bodies involved in appropriations persisted through-
out the life of the SES. Thus, vital expansion and capital replacement
costs in some of the statutory corporations had to be defrayed through
bank loans carrying interest rates as high as 10 per cent, despite statu-
tory provisions for government appropriations."' Government control
over principal aspects of the corporations' financial policy was equally
lax, again despite the formal provisions of the relevant statutes.
There are provisions-for instance, those authorizing the corpora-
tions to transfer up to five percent of their net profits to a staff welfare
fund-which may be used, subject to specific rules approved by the SES,
for such employee welfare facilities as "canteens, low interest bearing
staff welfare loans, and for other purposes aimed at enhancing the
welfare of the staff of the corporation.""' 4 Although the fund is ex-
pressed as a percentage of the net profits of the individual corpora-
tions,"' in practice those corporations that sustained continuing losses
and those that did not even keep profit and loss accounts appropriated
vitally needed capital for the provision of luxury items for high level
personnel and for practically irrecoverable advances to employees."0
Despite the statutory requirement of SES approval, the boards of the
corporations generally created and employed these funds without the
knowledge of the SES." 7 The practical supervision of the welfare fund
"'Legislative Instrument, No. 412, pt. 3, § 2 (Ghana).
"1d. pt. 3, § I.
"'U.N. REP., supra note 85, at 9.
13 Id.
1111d. Legislative Instrument No. 412, pt. 3, §§ 3 (1)-(4) (Ghana).
"1d. pt. 3, § 3 (2).
"'U.N. REP., supra note 85, at 10.
"'Id. at 6.
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was made even more difficult by corporations which did not keep profit
and loss accounts.
A second area of concern is the supervision of depreciation reserve
accounts which the legislative instruments invariably require the corpo-
rations to set up with the Bank of Ghana."' All amounts chargeable to
the profit and loss account in respect of depreciation for buildings,
plant, equipment and other fixed assets must be transferred to the ac-
count at the end of the financial year."' The instruments also limit the
use of the account to the replacement of fixed assets which are either
worn out or have become obsolete.' Such accounts are meant to over-
come the reluctance among government-run enterprises to replace old
and worn out plants with new and efficient means of production and are
customary in the practice of statutory corporations.' Because of their
obvious relation to the internal resources of the corporation (a corpora-
tion could cut its dependence on government financial assistance by
charging excessive amounts to depreciation), depreciation and reserve
accounts are generally made subject to specific and general government
direction. 2 Under the legislative instruments, however, neither the SES
nor the Minister has any control over the basis on which depreciation
is computed or the manner in which depreciation funds may be utilized.
The Paper Conversion Corporation for example, did not even bother to
set up a depreciation reserve account. 23
Government control over capital expenditure, a third major focus of
corporate financial policy, is even more confused. At the beginning of
each financial year, the statutory corporations are required 24 to prepare
a "production and financial plan" showing their expected turn-over and
gross receipts and a full breakdown of expected expenditures. 25 One
"lLegislative Instrument, No. 412, pt. 3, § 4(1) (Ghana).
"91d. § 4(2).
'
2
.1d. § 4(3).
11W. RoBSON, supra note 6, at 313-18.
'nSuch control in the case of nationalized industries is indirect but nevertheless effective. The
boards are generally required to include in revenue accounts only sums which are "properly
charged to revenue." In order to interpret this meaningfully the boards have to devise a consistent
formula for depreciation. The formula is currently regulated by the WHITE PAPER, CMND. No.
1337 (1961). A board cannot decide to charge an excessive amount to revenue for depreciation in
a particular year in order to reduce its dependence on external borrowing or government financing.
See generally Please, Government Control of the Capital Expenditure of the Nationalized
Corporation, 33 PUBLIc ADMIN. REV. 31 (1965).
'2ACCOUNTANT-GENERAL's REP., supra note 108, at 31.
121Legislative Instrument, No. 412, pt. 9, §§ I, 2 (Ghana).
'This is analogous to the "business type budget" that the U.S. public corporations are required
to submit annually under the Government Corporation Control Act of 1945, 31 U.S.C. § 847
(1964).
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may note that there are theoretical objections to the advance publication
of a budget by a public corporation. During United States Congres-
sional hearings for instance, corporation spokesmen expressed the fear
that their independence of commercial operation would be ham-strung
by a United States budget publication requirement. 2 Another objection
raised over a similar requirement for British nationalized industries was
that the practice could harm the ability of the corporations to resist
wage claims, especially where the budget showed a substantial profit. 12 7
In practice however, these fears have been belied in large measure be-
cause Congress has usually tended to tolerate a certain amount of gener-
ality in formulating the budget and allowing administrative transfer of
budgetary funds between projects. Aided by such a compromise, ad-
vance budget publication could provide a useful check on waste, espe-
cially in administrative expenditure.
The problems with the equivalent Ghanaian provision were of a
slightly different nature. To begin with, the personnel of the various
corporations did not possess the expertise required for the preparation
of such detailed plans. One may safely infer this from the fact that some
of them for their entire lives were never able to prepare profit and loss
accounts. 2 8 The assistance of the Accountant-General's Office or the
Office of the Planning Commission was sought rarely in the preparation
of the plans, probably because it was not a statutory obligation. When
qualified volunteers from these departments proffered their services, the
corporations usually rejected such offers as unwarranted intrusions into
managerial autonomy.' 9 The effective supervision of the production and
financial plan is scattered nebulously among some seven different gov-
•ernment agencies; the instruments require each corporation to send a
copy of its plan to its parent Ministry, the SES, the Office of the
Planning Commission, the Minister of Finance, the Bureau of Statistics
and the Central Committee of the Party. 3 The managing directors of
corporations are further required to submit quarterly reports to all these
'"The Commodity Credit Corporation, for instance, argued that variation in the price of goods
which the corporation handled could not be predicted accurately in advance because of fluctuations
in world price movements. The purchase price for the 1945 sugar crop, representatives argued, was
subject to negotiation with the Cuban representatives in spring 1945. Under the new provision, the
corporation would have to determine the price by July 1943. Hearings on H.R. 2177 Before the
House Comm. on Expenditures in the Executive Departments, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 195 (1945).
'1235 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 15, para. 129 (1958).
'2U.N. REP., supra note 85, at 10.
'
2 Statement by Mr. Ato-Manuel, formerly of the National Productivity Center, (currently with
the University of Wisconsin at Madison) during a telephone conversation with the author Decem-
ber 23, 1969.
' Legislative Instrument, No. 412, pt. 9, § I (Ghana).
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bodies except the central committee showing the extent to which their
corporations have achieved the goals and policies set out in their
plans. 31
As a result of the extreme decentralization of the supervisory function
and the inept articulation of the exact responsibilities of the various
supervisory organs, the financial transactions of the corporations were
simply disastrous. Capital goods were usually purchased under ex-
tremely inequitable supplier's credit terms, or at prices patently in ex-
cess of their market value or their potential for profit. 3 ' Out of a total
government grant of £G2,240,641, for instance, the Steel Works
Corporation spent a "disproportionately high" amount of £GI,650,000
on plant and office construction. 3 3 Schemes involving large capital
outlays were undertaken without regard to their economic soundness or
their relevance to the needs of the national economy.3 4 Administrative
expenditure was especially irresponsible. The Accountant-General's
Report for 1964 charged that the continuing losses of the Fibre-Bag
Manufacturing Corporation, although partly due to genuine economic
problems, were aggravated by "the lack of proper control over the
Corporation's capital expenditure."'' 35 In one example the management
spent about £G500 for the "purpose of a cow, sheep, drinks and other
things for the performance of certain rites to clear the factory site of
evils and dwarfs." ' 31 In another instance the corporation spent £G1,200
on a cocktail party to celebrate the anniversary of the formal opening
of a factory. 37 The true measure of the seriousness of these figures must
be weighed against the background fact that the corporation involved
was returning a steady annual loss of about £G141,563 on a total
government investment of over a million pounds (sterling). 3 Despite
varying degrees of control over the expenditures of the statutory corpo-
rations by some seven government agencies and ministers, the impact
of government control in the area was clearly negligible.3 9
Part of the reason for the near total lack of effective control over
capital expenditure, it has been noted, was the extreme decentralization
1'1d. pt. 9, § 5 (10) & (12).
"'U.N. REP., supra note 85, at 9.
'a3AcCOUNTANT-GENERAL's REP., supra note 108, paras. 196-97, at 29.
" The State Cocoa Marketing Board, for instance, made purchases of office and residential
property without proper valuation of the premises by competent authority and sometimes against
management insistence that there was no need for such purchases. See id. para. 243.
1'Id. para. 185, at 28.
"'Id. para. 185.
137/d.
luId.
1311d. paras. 183-84.
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of government supervisory control. Each of the seven agencies operated
as a separate administrative unit. They lacked any coordination, and
petty jealousies usually prevented the formulation of uniform policy
directions. 40 In addition, the legislative instruments performed poorly
in defining the roles of each of these agencies as regards the financial
commitments of the statutory corporations. Thus, the SES, although
created as the main supervisory agency, was placed on the same level
as the rest of the agencies. The Planning Commission, which had the
expertise badly needed by the corporations, was given the same powers
over the financial plans as the Central Committee of the Party or the
Bureau of Statistics. Indeed, some of these departments did not know
the exact nature of their responsibilities. The Minister of Communica-
tions, for instance, after a lengthy outpouring in Parliament lamenting
the financial irresponsibility of the statutory corporations, charged that
it was not the Finance Ministry's duty to check the continuing losses in
statutory corporations. In his opinion, it was the SES, not the Ministry
of Finance, which was responsible for the financial competence of the
corporations. 4' The SES could legitimately have retorted that both the
Finance Ministry and the SES had the same statutory controls over the
financial policies of the corporations.
Pricing policy, a fourth major aspect of corporate financial policy,
was equally removed from effective governmental supervision. Al-
though the corporate boards were required by the legislative instruments
to consult the SES and Ministry on pricing policies,4 2 they remained
independent in practice. The words of the statutes themselves permitted
that independence; by limiting the leverage of the SES and the Ministry
of Trade to consultation, the statutes left the boards as the final voice
in the formulation of pricing policies. In some cases the prices of prod-
ucts had no rational basis;4 3 large and deteriorating stocks of products
were reportedly a common feature of quite a few corporations.,
These aberrations in financial policy, especially in pricing policy, were
as much the result of statutory and administrative infirmities in the
corporate organization as of the lack of a clear-cut, logically consistent
governmental policy which the various government institutions having
jurisdiction over the corporations could administer. The SES statute
charges it with the "efficient and profitable operation of statutory cor-
"'See F. GOLCA, BUDGET STATEMENT 8 (1963-64) (Ghana).
135-39 PARL. DEB. 431 (1964-65) (Ghana).
"'Legislative Instrument, No. 412, pt. 1, § 2 (Ghana).
"'U.N. REP., supra note 85, at 10.
1441d.
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porations engaged in trade or industry or both,"'45 and the statutes of
the individual corporations all refer to profitability.'46 Official pro-
nouncements insist on the capitalist test, the difference between aggre-
gate revenue and average costs, as the measure of corporate efficiency.'47
This simple input-output test, which was part of the colonial legacy,
was totally unresponsive to the economic problems of the statutory
obligations. Most of the corporations were grossly over-capitalized, i.e.,
they acquired capital machinery at prices in excess of their value or
profit potential.' It was therefore impossible for them to maintain a
level of charges capable of yielding a "profit" unless, of course, they
were legally protected monopolies producing for an expansive market.
Far from enjoying such monopolistic positions, however, the corpora-
tions were usually in direct competition with long-established products
and were also operating against a strong wave of consumer resistance
to locally manufactured products.' Some corporations simply lacked
the capital resources to operate acquired machinery at optimum capac-
ity. 150 A matter of equal significance is that several of the industries were
undertaken because of the need to induce structural changes in the
national economy and thus break the precarious dependence on the
cocoa monoculture.'5 ' The application of the profitability test to such
corporations was thus inconsistent with the logic that induced their
establishment.
The balance sheet test further obscured economic advantages that
have greater significance for the national economy than the mere accu-
mulation of internal profits. One such advantage is the saving of foreign
"'Legislative Instrument, No. 457, pt. 2, § I (a) (Ghana).
"'Legislative Instrument, No. 412, pt. 3 § B (2) (Ghana).
"'See, e.g., the Sessional Address by the President, Fifth Session, January 12, 1965. The relevant
part of the address reads:
The number of state corporations which have been established has been determined by
our policy of socialist reconstruction and the building of a socialist economy in Ghana.
But the State Enterprises, like any other enterprise, have a duty to operate on a profita-
ble basis and thereby earn sufficient returns on the initial capital invested by Govern-
ment. Those in charge of State Enterprises must realize that the investments in the
factories with which they were entrusted, are financed from the hard-earned savings of
the individual taxpayer . . . and the Party and the Government expect reasonable
returns on these investments.
"'U.N. REP., supra note 85, at 9.
"'The "resistance" is probably caused more by economic factors than by consumer prejudice
against local products. For instance, between 1954 and 1961, local food prices increased 22%;
imported food prices increased 10%. See Szereszewksi, Pattern of Consumption, in BIRMINGHAM,
supra note 36, at 106-17.
'°U.N. REP., supra note 85, at 8.
'SEVEN YEAR DEVELOPMENT PLAN, supra note 9, at 93.
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exchange for the purchase of the capital requirements of industrial de-
velopment. For instance, the State Mining Corporation, which sus-
tained the largest aggregate losses and which was the most criticized of
the statutory corporations, was compelled by a delicate unemployment
problem to exploit ore that was considered unfit for private commercial
exploitation. Despite continuing "losses," its net foreign exchange earn-
ings were greater than the Ashanti Gilofields, a private company, which
showed substantial annual "profits."' 52 In a number of cases the conflict
between the government's policy of maximizing profits and the political
and economic implications of the official commitment to socialist plan-
ning were even more direct.'
While the internal contradictions and confusion in government policy
made the assurance of social responsibility in the statutory corporations
extremely difficult, the absence of an articulate policy objective and the
lack of an acceptable yardstick of success made the statutory controls
of the various agencies incapable of meaningful and effective applica-
tion.
E. The Central Contradiction
So far this article has argued that the system of controls, direction
and review provided for in the statutes did not have any real impact on
the vital aspects of corporate organization. The discussion now turns to
the statutory formula for ad hoc ministerial direction.
The Minister's relationship with the corporations is undeniably based
on the logic of colonial policy. He is authorized to give "directions of a
general character to the corporation as to the general policy of the
corporation and the corporations shall be bound to comply with such
direction."' 154 Attention has already been drawn to the logical and con-
ceptual problems with the Morrisonian dichotomy theory that dictated
the restriction on the Minister's powers of direction.'55 To these may be
added some evidence, partly intellectual and partly empirical, that the
assumption that greater ministerial direction would lead automatically
to "bureaucratic paralysis ' is open to serious doubt. In Britain, con-
trary to the Postmaster-General's fears, his responsibility to Parliament
'
5 See G. BING, REAP THE WHIRLWIND 397 (1968).
"U.N. REP., supra note 85, at 9. See also ACCOUNTANT-GENERAL'S REP., supra note 108, para.
183, where it is noted that government imposed restrictions on pricing sometimes accounted for
reported losses in statutory corporations.
"tLegislative Instrument, No. 412, pt. I I (Ghana).
"'See text following note 58 supra.
'Mr. Gaitskell's suggestion to that effect is in 443 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 74 (1958).
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for the details of his department's administration did not prevent the
Post Office from initiating an imaginative public relations policy or
from effecting a great measure of decentralization in the years immedi-
ately following the publication of the Bridgeman Committee Report. 57
Other government departments have demonstrated a respectable
amount of creativity despite their subjection to the full glare of parlia-
mentary scrutiny. 5 8 These and other arguments advanced previously 9
at least suggest that the bureaucracy and the lack of imagination that
are supposed to characterize traditional civil service organization are
neither exclusively nor primarily the result of ministerial "interference."
They may very well be the bequest of a more lackadaisical era when
administrative processes were less complex than they currently are. As
one authority has written, such bureaucracy and lack of imagination
"reflect the tendency of any well-established organization immune from
the competitive struggle for existence, to perpetuate routines that have
proved not unsatisfactory in the past."'' 0 (emphasis added).
The uncritical acceptance of the concept of restrictive ministerial
direction in Ghana meant a further weakening of an already ineffectual
system of government supervision and a watering down of the efficacy
of legislative inquiry. Despite a 1956 government proposal that the
National Assembly Standing Orders should be amended to permit ques-
tions on "day to day" management,' the rule of parliamentary inquiry
remained rather arbitrary, as the succeeding examples clearly indicate.
To a member's question on the cost of production in the Ghana Paint
Factory, the responsible Deputy Minister replied:
I can appreciate the Member's anxiety but he should be aware that the
information is confidential. I cannot therefore release it in public. At
any rate, if the Member calls at my Ministry the necessary papers will
be made available to him.6 2
The Deputy Minister's objection was not that the information was confi-
dential-indeed he was willing to make it available to the member at
his Ministry-but that the cost of production at the factory was an
"
7 REPORT OF THE BRIDGEMAN COMMITTEE ON THE POST OFFICE, CD. No. 4149 (1932) severely
criticized the running of the Post Office and recommended its subjection to a full blast of Parlia-
mentary inquiry. See also Hanson, Parliamentary Questions on the Nationalized Industry, 29
PUBLIC ADMIN. REV. 63 (1951).
I"Hanson, supra note 157, at 64.
'See note 58 and accompanying text supra.
'"A. HANSON, PARLIAMENT AND PUBLIC OWNERSHIP 102 (1961).
'GOVERNMENT PROPOSALS, supra note 21, at 8.
'"PARL. DEB., Col. 14 (1962) (Ghana).
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aspect of the factory's operation over which he had no de jure control.
On another occasion, when Mr. S. I. [drissu, an unusually inquisitive
Member of Parliament,' raised questions about irregularities at a
state hotel, particularly the practice of Ministers and party bosses ac-
commodating their mistresses at state hotels without paying any
charges,'64 the Speaker of the House snapped:
Order! I have told the Member several times that in criticising Minis-
tries he must be careful not to go beyond the rules. The other day I
pointed out that in accordance with Ministerial accountability, a Min-
ister is responsible for the broad policy of a corporate body but he is
not responsible for the day to day administration.'
Apparently, in the Speaker's estimation,. the fact that the alleged irregu-
larities were embodied in the Auditor-General's Report then before the
House did not make them any more subject to parliamentary inquiry.' 6
The arbitrariness of the Speaker's ruling is made manifest by the fact
that the same Speaker allowed questions on a curious miscellany of
subjects, viz., the number of gallons of gin produced by the Ghana
Distilleries Corporation between 1960 and 1961 and the number of
gallons of each brand produced;'67 justification for the cost of locally
produced toilet paper;'68 the cost per ton of 40,000 hundredweight of nail
wire imported by the Metal Industries Corporation;'69 and the reasons
for the increase in retail price of edible oil produced by the Nzima Oil
Mills.' 70
The distinction between these subjects and those relating to malprac-
tices in the hotels is clearly not that the former relates to "day to day"
affairs and the latter does not. The non-payment of charges by Minis-
ters' guests at state hotels is no more "day to day" than the cost and
the commercial justification therefor of imported raw material. Minis-
terial attitude towards questions was unnecessarily defensive. Admis-
sion of fault by the board or another Ministry was a commentary on
personal inefficiency and any question indicative of irregularity was
therefore conveniently categorized as "day to day." Inquiries such as
those regarding the reasons for the increase in the retail price of edible
"'He once personally detected pilfering at a state corporation and hotly pursued the thief.
'
64PARL. DEB., col. 525 (1963) (Ghana).
1'd., cols. 526-27.
'"Id., col. 527.
"'PARL. DEB., cols. 44-46 (1962) (Ghana).
... PARL. DEB., col. 227 (1963) (Ghana).
'"Id., col. 216.
11i1d., col. 216-17.
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oil were allowed to be answered because there were easily demonstrable
economic explanations over which neither Minister nor board had any
control. The Speaker willingly condoned this attitude.
All this, of course, is not saying that parliamentary questions are the
most effective way of exercising parliamentary control. There may be
some validity in the charge that such questions tend to be "casual,
capricious, superficial and inconclusive."' 7 ' The point here is that the
confusion surrounding the interpretation of the statutory restriction on
parliamentary questions reduced the efficacy not only of such questions,
but also of a more comprehensive method of parliamentary control
-debates on annual reports and accounts. The standard practice in
Britain is to apply the restrictions only on the scope of parliamentary
questions. Thus, comprehensive debate in the House of Commons takes
place when the Minister submits the report and accounts of a national-
ized industry.' Supply Days, the Queen's Speech, Welsh Days and
Scottish Days provide further, although more restricted, opportunities
for debate.' In Ghana, however, the restrictions on the scope of parlia-
mentary questions were also applied to debate. As has been noted,
members could not raise issues embodied in reports and accounts if they
related to matters of "day to day" administration.'74
F. A Summary of the Major Problems
The major categories of problems in defining the accountability-
autonomy dichotomy have been suggested above. They can be summa-
rized as follows:
I. The first major problem is the lack of an articulate and consistent
framework of economic and financial objectives in the various legisla-
tive instruments. This problem calls not for a detailed and rigid set of
directives on the details of commercial activity, but rather for a set of
explicit general guidelines capable of easy interpretation, which the cor-
poration may consult when making vital decisions. This is an especially
important matter in the case of the holding corporations. It has been
noted that the lack of such a general guideline in the IDC ordinance
resulted in its concentration on the catastrophic loans scheme." 5 In the
case of the SES, this lack encouraged the promotion of high-cost, paras-
"'See A. HANSON, supra note 160, at 51.
721d. at 44.
173id.
"'See note 58 and accompanying text supra.
'"See W. LEwis, supra note 44, at 13.
[Vol. 3: 55
GHANA'S STATUTORY CORPORATIONS
itic enterprises with no immediate relevance to the national economic
plan.
2. The second problem, which is actually a subcategory of the first,
is the absence in the various statutes of a sensible criterion of success,
which takes into account the special economic and social handicaps of
the individual corporations and which is consistent with the dual imper-
atives of economic viability and social responsibility. Because of the
lack of a realistic success indicator some corporations were regularly
criticized and condemned on account of "losses" that they sustained in
the process of providing other social and economic benefits incapable
of measurement by the arithmetic of the balance sheet but just as impor-
tant to the national interest as the accumulation of profit. The condem-
nation of the State Mining Corporation' is a case in point.'76
3. The most important problem in the attempt to provide accounta-
bility for statutory corporations is the existence and composition of their
boards of directors. While such boards have proved to be successful in
the Anglo-American setting,' they have thoroughly contaminated the
entire process of accountability in Ghana.
The usefulness of the board rests on a number of factors peculiar to
the so-called developed economy. Britain, for instance, inherited a large
pool of people with past managerial experience in the nationalized in-
dustries. Even outside this pool, there was an abundance of men with
the entrepreneurial skills required to run a corporation. 8 In a develop-
ing economy the opposite is usually true. Furthermore, the urge to use
such appointments to provide "jobs for the boys" or to neutralize politi-
cal threats is, for reasons that go beyond this study, usually irresista-
ble. 79 Again in a multiparty system, possible censorship or criticism by
the opposition party inevitably ensures a certain amount of rectitude in
official appointment. 80 As the case of Ghana clearly demonstrates, how-
ever, a developing economy tends to gravitate towards one-party rule.' 8'
'See note 152 and accompanying text supra.
'For an account of the very central function of the Board in the organization of nationalized
industries in Britain, see W. ROBSON, supra note 6, at 212. See also Chester, supra note 63, at 43.
'"See Morrison, supra note 64, at 1.
"'General Ankrah, former chairman of the National Liberation Council was named a director
of the Ghana Commercial Bank upon his "forced" retirement from the armed forces. The underly-
ing motive for the appointment was political expediency. There was absolutely no doubt that
General Ankrah would find the workings of a commercial banking operation an incomprehensible
mess! See G. BING, supra note 152, at 396-97.
"'See W. ROBSON, supra note 6, at 219.
"''Mr. Geoffrey Bing, one time Attorney-General and later Constitutional Advisor of the Nkru-
mah government, adequately described the forces that generate that tendency when he wrote:
The demand in Ghana for a one-party state was, in essence, a negative reaction to the
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Once competence is removed, as it very definitely was in Ghana, as a
basis for board appointments, the board's relationship with the Minister
becomes one of vassal and lord. This situation sets in motion a chain
reaction that affects every level of corporate management.
4. The restriction of ministerial direction to matters of general pol-
icy provides delinquent Ministers with a shield against parliamentary
scrutiny, which means that glaring irregularities in management
continue unchecked, and at the same time deprives responsible Minis-
ters of the power to ensure public responsibility in the board. The situa-
tion is aggravated further by the confusion surrounding what is "day to
day" and what is "policy" which results in the arbitrary categorization
of matters of national importance as "day to day" and the removal of
such matters from the Minister's effective jurisdiction.
5. A fifth major problem, which derives from the fourth, is the laxity
of parliamentary control through debate and questioning. Again the
rigid application of the Morrisonian dichotomy means in practice that
details of financial malpractices cannot be questioned in the House even
when they are embodied in financial accounts and reports submitted to
that body.
6. The sixth problem is the lack of coordination among the various
administrative organs entrusted with different degrees of control over
various aspects of the corporation's activities. The lack of supervision
and direction resulting from the decentralization of supervisory roles
makes itself manifest particularly in the financial management of the
various corporations. The statutory designation of the SES as the con-
duit through which all directions, authorizations and information reach-
ing the individual corporations has to pass is a halfway measure, whose
usefulness is further dissipated in practice by direct communication
between the agencies and the corporations. Since these supervisory
agencies are the repositories of the existing expertise, their disorganiza-
tion deprives the corporation of vital technical advice.
II. A BLUEPRINT FOR INSTITUTIONAL REFORM
Admittedly, certain of the problems that affect the operation of statu-
tory corporations are purely economic or social, or both. The shortage
long history of conspiracy from the days of the opposition MP's [members of Parlia-
ment], Amponsah and Apaloo in the Awhaitey affair, to the MP R.B. Otchere's involve-
ment in the terrorism of later days. The two-party system was suppressed not in accord-
ance with any specific theory, but simply because the existence of a second party ap-
peared to give a cover for the organization of unconstitutional violence.
G. BING, supra note 152, at 443.
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of raw materials 8 ' and consumer bias against locally manufactured
products were common problems in the Ghanaian experience. The ex-
tent to which these socioeconomic problems contributed to the gloomy
history of public enterprise in Ghana is difficult to judge. No suggestions
for reform can underplay the significance of these factors. Accordingly,
the proposal that follows only aims at making the statutory corpora-
tions functioning units of a comprehensive economic strategy to the
extent that this can be done by legislation.
The theory that emerges from the preceding analysis is that the most
essential condition for the efficient operation of public enterprise in a
developing economy is the improvement of the quality of government
directions, channeled through a centralized and efficient organ to the
statutory corporations. The usefulness of a board of directors also needs
to be questioned. The ensuing proposal completely rejects the central
axiom of the Anglo-American model of the public corporation that the
closer the government gets into the business of the corporation the more
inefficient the latter becomes. That model, after all, represents a politi-
cal compromise that was supposed to be capable of yielding the best of
the two worlds of the limited liability company and the government
department.' Significantly, the nature of the compromise has tended
to reflect the political realities of a given forum. In France, for instance,
a strong labor movement in the immediate post-World War II years
produced the so-called tripartite principle in the composition of the
governing board of the nationalized industries.'84 While the facts of the
Ghanaian experiment are capable of sustaining more than one set of
conclusions, 8 5 they clearly do not bear out the prophecy of the best of
both worlds.
The new model, as presented, deals only with the relationship between
the corporations, the Government and the Legislature, i.e., the elements
of public control. Individual aspects of corporate organization are thus
considered only to the extent that they form part of the process of
accountability.
"'See BIRMINGHAM, supra note 36, at 291.
"See W. ROBSON, supra note 6, at 59.
'4d. at 216.
"Especially since there are purely economic and social factors-shortage of raw materials, lack
of trained personnel, consumer resistance etc.-which also actively affected the operation of the
statutory corporations.
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A. The National Commission on Public Corporations: Composition
Instead of the current holding corporation organized on commercial
lines and accountable on the same principles and to the same extent as
the active subsidiary, the model envisages a pool of experts presided
over by a Minister with authority to veto decisions of the Commission
which in his opinion conflict with the national interest. The Minister
appoints members of the Commission on the basis of merit and the
Cabinet approves the appointments. Dismissals follow the same proce-
dure. The essential prerequisite of course is to place the most qualified
individuals on the Commission. This is a goal that cannot be achieved
merely by legislative fiat. Knowledge and prior experience in industry
are necessary conditions and may be required by statute. But the Minis-
ter should be allowed the discretion to determine whether appointees
also possess the resourcefulness and the drive and imagination that are
required for policymaking. Appointments and the basis on which they
should be made do not require extensive argument. The real problem is
the prescription of the conditions on which such appointments may be
revoked. This is the area in which two important considerations, viz.,
the personal need for security, without which men of integrity would be
hard to attract, and the government's need to remove incompetent per-
sonnel inevitably clash. Thus, it requires an especially careful resolution.
The pattern of legislation in the Anglo-American experience is rather
contradictory in this area. The British Nationalization Acts generally
require that members of the board be appointed for fixed terms, but the
Minister usually can dismiss them at any time.' The position in the
United States is generally similar. The Chairman of the TVA, although
he is appointed for a fixed term, has been held to be removable at any
time by the President. 187 The argument for summary dismissal by the
appointing authority is of course powerful, but there is no denying that
such dismissals undercut the security that appointees are supposed to
enjoy. I18
'W. ROBSON, supra note 6, at 237.
" See Morgan v. TVA, 28 F. Supp. 732 (E.D. Tenn. 1939), affd, 115 F.2d 990 (6th Cir. 1939),
cert. denied, 312 U.S. 701 (1940).
"'It has been suggested that:
The proper principle . . . is that members of the governing board should enjoy security
of tenure for a limited number of years, specified at the time of appointment, and that
they should be liable to dismissal at any time for disability, insolvency, neglect of duty,
misconduct, or on other grounds if reasonable cause can be shown, but not otherwise
.* .. (emphasis added).
W. ROBSON, NATIONALIZED INDUSTRY AND PUBLIC OWNERSHIP 242 (2d ed. 1962).
This is hardly a satisfactory formula. It leaves two basic questions unanswered: What is reasona-
ble, and who makes the determination?
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There does not seeril to be any problem with accepting the Minister's
power of dismissal in clear cases such as physical disability, insolvency
or proven neglect of duty. It is the exercise of that power solely on
grounds of policy disagreements that has raised the most controversy. 18
No easy solution is conceivable. In this proposal, however, it is hoped
that the presence of the Minister on the Commission and his power to
overrule policies that appear to him to conflict with the national interest
will make arbitrary dismissals on grounds of policy differences highly
unlikely. The approval of the entire Cabinet on such dismissals will
further decrease their arbitrariness.
It will be noted from Table I that the Commission has at its disposal
an entire center devoted to research and analysis of special phases of
industrial activity. The Commission consequently is placed in a better
position than either the SES or IDC to collect and coordinate technical
data and information and to undertake the general supervision of the
statutory enterprises. In order to enable the Commission to develop its
own personality and to formulate conditions of employment most likely
to produce maximum efficiency among its personnel it is removed from
the civil service, although its members may be drawn therefrom.
1. The Nature of the Commission's Accountability
The establishment of the holding company as an ordinary commercial
enterprise, whereby the holding company enjoyed the same amount of
autonomy as the subsidiary, allowed the holding company to completely
avoid its duty to the public at large. 9 In the proposed model the Com-
mission is recognized as essentially a policymaking body and as such is
made fully accountable to the Legislature and to the Cabinet as to all
matters concerning statutory corporate activity. The application of the
Morrisonian dichotomy to the Commission is thus abolished. Responsi-
bility to the Cabinet ensures that the policies of the Commission and
its subsidiaries do not conflict with those of other government depart-
ments while accountability to the Legislature provides an extra check
on the efficiency of investments and their conformity with the national
interest.
There is at least one danger in placing the Minister on the Commis-
sion: He may become so intimately involved in the technical and other
problems of the individual industries that he may become incapable of
"'Witness the acrimonious debate that accompanied the forced resignation of Mr. Steven
Handie, Chairman of the Iron and Steel Corporation of Great Britain in 1952. 496 PARL. DEB.,
H.C. (5th ser.) 55, cols. 774 ff. (1952).
"'See text following note 14 supra.
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taking a comprehensive view of major aspects of broad policy. It is
hoped that the Cabinet's control over the Commission will provide that
overall perspective. The Minister's participation in the Commission's
decision-making process will give him enough intimacy with the opera-
tion of the subsidiaries to enable him to answer inquiries in the Legisla-
ture meaningfully. The principal objection to making the Commission
fully accountable to the Cabinet and the Legislature is that this will
make them overcautious and consequently unimaginative. Part of the
answer to this objection is that extreme circumspection and the attend-
ant lack of imagination need not follow from such accountability. Sec-
ondly, the Commission will be engaged in the formulation of policy
decisions which are subject to ministerial direction under current stan-
dards. Thirdly, it should be noted that the Commission is not an elected
body. It does not carry any political responsibility in and of itself.
Therefore, to entrust it with the entire organization and operation of the
subsidiaries without making it accountable to the Legislature would be
fatal disruption of the "checks and balances" inherent in the democracy.
Specific aspects of the Commission's organization, such as funding,
audits and annual reports may follow the same pattern as that of the
SES. The Commission's funds will consist of annual parliamentary
appropriations, but provision should be made for supplementary appro-
priations whenever necessary. Major items of expenditure should re-
ceive the Minister's approval. Annual records and accounts should be
prepared according to the specifications of the Auditor-General's Office
which will also be responsible for auditing the corporations. The
Auditor-General's Report together with the Commission's Annual Re-
port should be presented to the Legislature. There does not seem to be
any reason to increase government control over the Commission's fi-
nances. Most of its capital will go into administrative expenses since the
finances of the individual subsidiaries do not form part of its budget.
2. The Nature of the Commission's Relationship with the
Subsidiaries
The logical justification for the Commission's total accountability to
the Legislature is its comprehensive power of direction and control over
the subsidiaries. The proposed model does not envisage any restriction
on the Commission's powers of direction. The amount of autonomy that
may be allowed the corporations in their commercial operation is thus
subject to the discretion of the Commission. In practice, the Commis-
sion's discretion will be exercised in relation to how much confidence it
places in a particular management and the potential impact of any
business activity on national policy. There is nothing in the Ghanaian
1973]
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experience which suggests that this will lead to a stifling of initiative in
management. On the contrary, the rigid prescription of areas of auton-
omy often led to the isolation of the subsidiaries from the expert advice
they needed. With the entrepreneurial talent available in the Commis-
sion and its center, it will be safer to allow it a free hand in determining
the proper amount of managerial autonomy than to prescribe statutory
limitations which the Commission may find unjustifiable in individual
cases.
In special areas of corporate finance, however, the Commission must
issue directives to the subsidiaries. Thus, such matters as prices, borrow-
ing, capital expenditure, budgeting and the operation of depreciation
and reserve accounts, which were least controlled under the IDC and
the SES, will be under expert supervision. The concentration of supervi-
sory power in the Commission will prevent the overlapping supervision
which previously permitted fiscal abuses in the operation of the subsidi-
aries. ' As a corollary of its power of supervision the Commission may
enjoin direct communication between any administrative agency and the
subsidiaries.
B. The Organization of the Subsidiaries
1. Management and Control
In the proposed model the most significant break with the current
organization of the statutory corporations is the absence of a board of
directors. The theory that a board of directors is an essential attribute
of the public corporation is a myth that is accepted largely because
incorporation laws generally require the setting up of a board of
directors elected by stockholders. 2 There is nothing in the history of
the public corporation that suggests the board is an absolute necessity.
The U.S. Inland Waterways Corporation and the Public Housing Ad-
ministration operated effectively without boards.' In the Ghanaian
experience, there are serious reasons to question the board's utility. Far
from being the buffer between corporate autonomy and public account-
ability, it has been demonstrated that the boards were usually the con-
duit through which political and incompetent appointments reached the
corporations. The perversion of the relationship between board and
Minister not only undermined the authority of the SES, but seriously
affected the quality of low-level personnel. It has been fashionable to
"'See text accompanying notes 127-38 supra.
"'See Seidman, The Government Corporation: Its Place in the Federal Structure, in PUBLIC
ENrERPRIZE 41, 43-44 (A. Hanson, ed. 1955).
"'od. at 45.
[Vol. 3: 55
GHANA'S STATUTORY CORPORATIONS
write off the general incompetence of board members as another exam-
ple of the political excesses of a corrupt Nkrumah regime. 9 ' In the
opinion of this writer, this is an extremely narrow-minded interpretation
of a complicated phenomenon. Generally, the performance of the cur-
rent government in the area of official appointments has been no better
than that of the dissolved military dictatorship of the National Libera-
tion Council.' The problem has its roots in the nature of party organi-
zation in the post-independence state. Once a party gets into office, the
"spoils system" inevitably places important offices in some incompetent
hands. Of course this is not a phenomenon peculiar to "underdevelop-
ment," but there is a significant difference in degree. The tendency to
appoint unqualified people to the boards is very likely to continue.'96
A more practical reason for the abolition of the board is the nature
of the Commission's composition. The extreme centralization of policy
formation in the Commission and the expert advice available to it make
another layer of policy formation, i.e., the Board of Directors, positively
redundant. A possible alternative would be to have a functional instead
of a policymaking board, but such a device would make questionable
use of already scant talent.'97
With the elimination of the board, the managing director assumes
greater responsibility since he combines a certain amount of policy
decision with the actual management of the corporation. Under the
proposed model he will be appointed by the Minister on the recommen-
dation of the Commission and he will enjoy the same amount of security
as the members of the Commission. If he were to enjoy a greater
amount of security, his accountability to the Commission might be
seriously undermined. As has been noted, the extent of the director's
accountability to the Commission, except in designated areas, is subject
to the discretion of the Commission.9 8
2. The Process of Accountability in the Subsidiary
The principal merit of the model in this area is that the statutory
corporations are made accountable to only one identifiable body-the
National Commission. The nebulous allocation of supervisory roles
'See, e.g., NATIONAL LIBERATION COUNCIL, THE REBIRTH OF GHANA 23 (1966).
'A national daily openly admitted the problem when it reported that bribery and corruption in
high places and low places "has become unfortunately a feature of our national life ... indisputa-
ble, disillusioning, and most distressing . . . . so serious that one wonders whether this social
disease can ever be cured." Ghanaian Times, Oct. 16, 1967.
'gild.
" 
7 U.N. REP., supra note 85, at 7.
"'See text immediately preceeding note 189 supra.
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among diverse agencies and ministries and the resulting chaos is thereby
remedied.
Appointments and dismissals of high level personnel remain a part
of the process of accountability; such appointments will be made by the
Minister on the advice of the Commission.
As a first step towards improving the fiscal accountability of the
corporations, their financial obligations should be clearly stated. The
nature of their responsibility is certainly a matter which the Government
should decide within the context of the overall national interest. A clear
formulation of financial goals will require a comprehensive study, but
a few suggestions may be offered here.
The major weakness of the present system of financial control is that
it lacks a criterion of efficiency compatible with the social responsibili-
ties of the various corporations. The test of profitability is too narrow
and does not permit a comprehensive appraisal of the corporation's
contribution to the national economy. If the profitability test is retained,
the government may find it necessary to erect protective tariffs and to
improve the supply of raw materials in individual cases.'99 Given the
present obstacles to manufacturing, however, it may be a more prag-
matic policy to require the corporations to break even, or even to permit
a loss, except in cases where overall operating conditions and the size
of available market clearly permits the realization of "profits."
Revenue Account-Capital Account
Within the framework of a break-even policy, the corporations
should, subject to specific direction by the Commission, ensure that
surpluses on revenue accounts are at least sufficient to cover deficits
over a specified period of years. Depreciation and reserve accounts and
the basis on which these are computed should also be subject to specific
direction by the Commission. A system of budgets and audits is inevita-
ble if the Commission is to maintain its leverage on the finances of the
corporations. The corporation's budget, which may take the form of the
current production and financial plan, is, as has been noted, prepared
with the help of the relevant department of the Commission where
necessary, and is also subject to the Commission's specification. The
Legislature may make modifications in the budget only when the na-
"'There is no doubt that in certain cases stiff competition from already established products,
and the shortage of raw materials pose serious problems. The Ghana Soap Factory, for instance,
increased its earnings 300% during a temporary shortage of imported soap. See BIRMINGHAM, supra
note 36, at 290.
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tional interest so requires.20 1 It is hoped, however, that given the special-
ized nature of the Commission's composition the Legislature will in
practice accept the Commission's approval of a budget as indicative of
its conformity with the national interest. The current statutes do not
give the Legislature any such power, but past experience suggests that
a limited power of modification by the Legislature is desirable. Another
feature which is absent in current legislation is the switching of expendi-
tures as itemized in the budget. Whether in practice this injected an
unnecessary amount of rigidity in expenditures is impossible to tell. To
avoid that possibility it is desirable that the management of individual
corporations be permitted to switch expenditures. The corporation,
however, should limit itself to a statutory upper limit on amounts expen-
dible on investment, to be fixed each year by the Commission. The
system of auditing also needs special consideration since this no doubt
constitutes a significant instrument of government control.2 "1 The pres-
ent system of auditing has limited efficacy. Under the current system
the Auditor-General or any auditor appointed by him performs an effi-
ciency audit aimed only at judging the effectiveness and efficiency of
operations and not at ensuring conformity to appropriation limits. This
is adequate for those corporations which either break even or make
profits and are therefore self-financing. But as to those corporations
which continuously sustain losses, and therefore are the beneficiaries of
regular appropriations, there is an additional need for compliance with
limits which an efficiency audit does not satisfy. A combination of
regular financial audits and efficiency audits would be a better guide to
the financial responsibility of the corporations. However, since the
Commission is so intimately connected with the corporation's budget
and its overall policy, it would be unwise to entrust it with the entire
auditing function. Under the model, the Commission will perform a
regular financial audit aimed at determining the conformity of total
expenditure to budgetary specifications. To provide an extra guide to
corporate efficiency, however, the Auditor-General or any auditor ap-
pointed by him will perform the efficiency audit. Annual reports should
also be prepared by the corporations according to the specifications of
the Commission and presented to the Legislature. Each corporation
should include in its annual report a list of all Commission directions.
2Cf. Siegel, The United States Post Office Incorporated: A Blueprint for Reform, 66 MICH.
L. REv. 615, 666 (1968).
20'See, e.g., Beech, Role of the General Accounting Office in the Regulation of Industry, 21 Bus.
LAW. 235 (1965).
1973]
GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
This will undoubtedly enable the Legislature to appraise the merits of
government policy.'"'
III. CONCLUSION
Public discontent with the organization of statutory corporations has
been smoldering for a long time. The demand for closer government
control than the Anglo-American model allows has been voiced time
and again.2 3 The need for a positive proposal for reorganization cannot
therefore be gainsaid. The proposed model is not offered as a panacea
for the problems that beset statutory corporate activity in a developing
economy. It is hoped, however, that it will initiate discussion and reap-
praisal of the fundamental assumptions of the current model, which are
based on the colonial tradition, and that in the process of debate a better
proposal more suited to the exigencies of underdevelopment will
emerge.
"'This will inevitably curb the issuing of irresponsible or ill-considered directions. The Minister
becomes accountable for the manner in which he employs his authority and is thus publicly
responsible for the results of his direction. This will discourage the natural inclination among public
officials to exercise authority without accounting publicly for it. See Chester, supra note 102, at
42-43.
"'See GOVERNMENT PROPOSALS, supra note 21.
[Vol. 3: 55
